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Ethics, organ donation and tax:
a reply to Quigley and Taylor
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen,1 Thomas Søbirk Petersen2
A national opt-out system of post-mortem donation of scarce organs is preferable to an opt-in
system. Unfortunately, the former system is not always feasible, and so in a recent JME article we
canvassed the possibility of offering people a tax break for opting-in as a way of increasing the
number of organs available for donation under an opt-in regime. Muireann Quigley and James
Stacey Taylor criticize our proposal. Roughly, Quigley argues that our proposal is costly and, hence,
is unlikely to be implemented, while Taylor contests our response to a Titmuss-style objection to
our scheme. In response to Quigley, we note that our proposal’s main attraction lies in gains not
reflected in the figures presented by Quigley and that the mere fact that it is costly does not imply
that it is unfeasible. In response to Taylor, we offer some textual evidence in support of our
interpretation of Taylor and responds to his favoured interpretation of the Titmuss-style objection
that many people seem to want to donate to charities even if they can deduct their donations from
their income tax. Finally, we show why our views do not commit us to endorsing a free
organ-market.
There is a shortage of organs available for
donation. A national opt-out system of
postmortem donation is preferable to an
opt-in system, in our view. Unfortunately,
in some countries opt-out systems are
currently unpopular, and so in a recent
Journal of Medical Ethics article we canvassed
the possibility of offering people a tax
break for opting in as a way of increasing
the number of organs available for dona-
tion under an opt-in regime.1
Muireann Quigley and James Stacey
Taylor criticised our proposal.2 3 As far as
we can see the distance between it and
Quigley ’s and Taylor ’s views is not huge,
and of course we thank them for their
thoughtful responses.
REPLY TO QUIGLEY
Quigley makes two main points. She
claims, first, that if it were introduced in
the UK our scheme would be likely to
involve net economic loss. (The least
optimistic figure she presentsdbased on
a 50% tax rate as in the most recent UK
budget rather than a 45% rateddescribes
a net annual cost of £166.8m. The most
optimistic figuredin Quigley ’s view, an
unrealistic onedsuggests a net annual
saving of £7.66m.) Second, for this reason,
she claims that it is unlikely that the
scheme would ‘garner the support of poli-
ticians and policymakers’.
In support of her first point, Quigley
judiciously points to a number of factors:
for example, that the transplantation of
organs other than kidneys will not involve
the cost savings secured through reduced
need for dialysis. We will not dispute the
details of Quigley ’s claims, because we
never contended that our proposal would
result in net savings in purely economic
terms. The figures we presented, such as
the £200 tax break, were meant to be
largely illustrative. The financial savings
involved in taking patients off dialysis were
mentioned to address a potential objection,
but our proposal’s main attraction lies in
gains not reflected in the figures presented
by Quigley. With one qualification, one
of Quigley ’s own remarks captures our
view well: ‘We might think that the
overall benefits, in terms of lives saved and
improvements in quality of life, of having
more organs to transplant outweigh any
increase in costs in purely economic
terms’. The qualification is that we would
prefer, for obvious reasons, not to talk of
offsetting any increase in costs in purely
economic terms. Still, such significant
benefits might outweigh substantial extra
costs in purely economic terms.
As a criticism of our paper Quigley ’s
second point is a little wide of the mark,
because our main aim was to describe
a scheme that improves on present opt-in
schemes, not one that there is political
will to implement. However, her argu-
ment is not entirely beside the point
either, because we put forward our
scheme as a second-best solution given
the lack of political will to implement an
opt-out system. Hence, if our proposal is,
politically speaking, as unrealistic as an
opt-out scheme, it loses attraction.
However, even if, as Quigley argues, our
proposal involves net costs, it does not
follow that it is politically unrealistic.
Economic considerations are not the only
drivers of political decision making and
politicians have been known in the past
to introduce healthcare schemes that
raise net costs. They have also introduced
tax breaks (eg, for donations to charity)
even though this can impose net costs on
the state.
REPLY TO TAYLOR
Taylor makes three critical points: (1) that
we misconstrue the Titmuss-style objec-
tion to our proposal; (2) relatedly, that our
response to the Titmuss objection as we
construe it fails to bear on the Titmuss-
style objection rightly construed; and (3)
that one of our responses implies that
instead of arguing in favour of a tax break
we should ‘argue for the morality of using
market forces to secure’ an increased
number of organs.
In connection with (1) Taylor says the
real concern underlying the Titmuss objec-
tion is ‘that offering incentives to donate
organs when such donation was previously
uncompensated would eliminate the possi-
bility that persons could ‘purely’ donate
their organs in a situation where compen-
sation was not available’. This is prob-
lematic, according to Taylor, because it
compromises the autonomy of citizens ‘by
removing a valuable option from their
choice set’ or because, depending on people’s
attitudes to (as it were) pure and impure
donation, ‘the offer of compensation would
lead to fewer organs being donated’.
Presumably, when Taylor refers to ‘the
real concern underlying the Titmuss objec-
tion’ this is the concern that will emerge in
the best reading of what Titmuss wrote.
However, there is not just one, but several
plausible accounts of what that con-
cern is. We quoted Titmuss’ remark that
governments should ‘weaken market
forces which put men in positions where
they have little opportunity to make
moral choices or to behave altruistically
if they so wish’. On the reasonable
assumption that the last part of this
sentence reveals Titmuss’ reasons for
favouring gifts over market exchanges, in
this passage, at least, his real concern lies
closer to the objections we address than
the one Taylor describes.
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However, Taylor ’s first challenge is not
his most important. For if the complaint
he describes is forceful, it does not matter
hugely whether Titmuss actually made
it. Taylor suggests two ways in which
the complaint can be construed: as an
autonomy-based or supply-based objec-
tion. We address the first of these rather
directly, in that we argue that our scheme
adds two valuable options to people’s
choice sets, that is, opting in with a tax
break (for oneself or one’s favourite
charity) or opting in declining a tax
break, and that this more than offsets the
loss of the option of donating without
the possibility of compensation or
reward. In short, the choice set facing
potential donors under our scheme is
different but not less valuable overall
from the point of view of autonomy than
the choice set facing potential donors
under a scheme without the availability
of compensation.
Turning to the supply-based objection,
we concede that we did not face this
challenge directly in the discussion of
Titmuss’ objection we presented (even if
we did address it in a general form in the
previous section entitled ‘The no effect
and counterproductiveness objection’). We
did speak to it indirectly, however, in that
we argued that there is no reason to think
that people would ‘desire to donate their
organs to help others only if they believed
that pure donation without the possibility
of compensation was the only way to aid’.
Desires are informed by judgement, and in
presenting our scheme we observe, for
example, that many people seem to want
to donate to charities even if they can
deduct their donations from their income
tax. We say it is unclear why the case of
organs is relevantly different.
At this point Taylor might respond that
it is irrelevant whether people ought not
to have this desiredthe fact is that some
do. But that in itself does not defeat
our proposal. To defeat it one would have
to show that people with this desire
outnumber people with the desire to
donate their organs only when offered
a tax break (perhaps just to decline it).
Taylor does not do that, so at most his
objection shows that our article does not
settle all of the issues raised by our tax
scheme.
We turn to objection (3), which runs as
follows. Some people will refuse to donate
organs if organs have any ‘price’ at all. The
size of the financial incentive offered to
people who opt in on our scheme will not
reduce the number of people who decline
to opt in for this reason. However, the
magnitude of the incentive presumably
does matter to the people who can be
nudged into donating with a financial
incentive. Hence, we ‘should favour
allowing donors to profit from their
donation, and not merely be compensated
for it. Instead of advocating tax credits to
increase the numbers of organs procured,
then, they should argue for the morality
of using market forces to secure them’.
Things move quite swiftly here, we feel.
The first sentence of Taylor ’s we quote
does not quite capture our position. We
did not rule out the possibility that the
tax credit would do more than compen-
sate people who opt in. As for the second
sentence, it should be remembered that
our limited ambition was to describe
a system that would improve the present
situation in many opt-in countries. We
left the question whether a market for
organs would create an even better system
unanswered. We doubt that our endorse-
ment of a system of tax credits automat-
ically commits us to accepting a market
solution. As grave as the aim is, there are
other important aims and values at stake,
and a free market for organs may well
clash with some of these. Specifically, we
discuss objections to our scheme based
on the values of non-exploitation, non-
commodification and equality, arguing
that these can be met by our proposal. For
all this, the objections might apply force-
fully to a similar, but marketised system
(or a market for permissions to use one’s
organs once one is dead, if this is what
Taylor has in mind).
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